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Shifting Policies in Conflict Arenas: A Cosine Similarity and
Text Mining Analysis of Turkey’s Syria Policy, 2012-2016
Abstract
Turkish policy towards the Syrian civil war, as operationalized in relation to the
implementation of no-fly zones, safe zones or buffer zones, has been the subject of much
debate among scholars. As the number of foreign states acting in Syria has steadily
increased since the onset of the crisis, Turkish policies have similarly shifted. In order to
make sense of Turkey’s actions and reactions in the first five years of the Syrian civil war,
this article attempts to draw lessons from quantitative methods and methodologies such as
text mining, cosine similarity and cosine normalization of content from the Anadolu Agency
(AA), a Turkish state-owned press. These methodologies are utilized in support of content
analysis and qualitative analysis that hindsight allows. In doing so, we are able to show that
these seemingly inexplicable shifts may adhere to a logic and, in some cases, could have
been anticipated. Utilizing such methodologies therefore offers a potentially significant
contribution to the literature by defining politically feasible outcomes related to foreign or
domestic policies.
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Introduction: Setting the Stage
Syria’s civil war has produced a myriad of national security challenges for
Turkey.1 Ankara’s response has oscillated between trying to insulate itself
from the effects of conflict to policies seeking to shape the situation in its
southern neighbor. During the period of this research, from 2012 to 2016,
Turkey’s policies and actions towards Syria appeared contradictory. Many
observers had a hard time explicating what was at play.2 This was certainly
the case with Turkish initiatives to establish either buffer zones, safe
zones, or no-fly zones–or all three at the same time–in Syria. This research
is an attempt to shed light on the best accounts for Ankara’s changeable
policy toward various foreign policy options, such as buffer zones and nofly zones by using methodologies such as text mining and related cosine
similarity measures of reporting by the Anadolu Agency (AA), a Turkish
state-owned press. In doing so, we are able to show a basic structure of the
international relations of Turkey in relation to Syria through the
quantitative analysis of related texts. Applying these methodologies in
concert with content analysis and qualitative analysis can potentially shed
further light on what appear, at first glance, to be Turkey’s seemingly
inexplicable policy shifts.
As the Arab Spring gained strength in 2011, protests engulfed Syria and
threatened the Ba’athist regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Assad and
loyalist forces turned to bombardment and violence in order to cling to
power, losing legitimacy with many inside and outside the country. At this
early stage, Turkey’s role was arguably constructive and focused. Over a
decade of engagement with and investment in Syria, Turkey tried to use its
influence by brokering a resolution leaving Assad in power. However,
Turkey faced sustained pressure from Washington and other NATO allies
to sever ties with Damascus after US President Barrack Obama declared
Assad illegitimate. This pressure was comprised of diplomatic efforts and
negative reporting in the international press arguing that collusion with
Assad made Turkey complicit in Syria’s bloodbath. Additionally, as
Turkish public opinion turned against Assad and domestic pressure
increased, Ankara desisted in its attempted role as peace broker.
When Turkey cut ties with Assad in September 2011, it immediately
became one of the most vocal critics of the Ba’athist regime, demanding
Assad’s unconditional exit prior to any resolution in the Syrian crisis. It
was also at this time, in September 2011, that Ankara first discussed the
establishment of a buffer zone, and formally endorsed this course of
action, contingent on international support and approval, in November of
that year.3 By March 2012, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was
examining the options of both a “safe zone” and “buffer zone.”4 From that
point onward, Turkish policy shifted between safe zones, buffer zones and
no-fly zones.5 From one perspective, it is unsurprising that Turkey would
1
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explore these different policies. There are various options for states
attempting to demilitarize an area, and multiple reasons for wanting to do
so. These concepts – safe zone, buffer zone, and no-fly zone–have
particular meanings in international law and politics and state officials
enact them with specific policy purposes in mind, as described in greater
detail below.
Safe zones are spaces where civilians or the injured are protected from
belligerents.6 Despite past failures in their establishment in Bosnia and
Rwanda, the creation of territorial sanctuaries free of military activity has
an enduring appeal for decision-makers. 7 Indeed, in early 2017, US
President Donald Trump said he would “absolutely do safe zones in
Syria.”8 Sometimes referred to as safe havens, safety zones, humanitarian
corridors, or protected areas, safe zones are, in essence, humanitarian
buffer zones designed to shield civilians from violence.9 As shown below,
this is commensurate with how the Turkish media reporting typically
interprets the terms. Enacting safe zones is usually a multilateral effort
done to protect population clusters, such as whole towns (as in Bosnia) or
over wider areas (Kurdish Iraq in 1991). The underlying stated principle
behind safe zones is that civilians are outside the realm of conflict and
worthy of protection.
A buffer zone is about the spatial delimitation of a strip of territory, either
adjacent to a border or in between two warring parties within a state. The
US military defines a buffer zone as “a defined area controlled by a peace
operations force [. . .] formed to create an area of separation between
disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.”
This definition accurately describes multilaterally supervised zoned-off
areas, such as in Cyprus. Unilateral establishment aims at creating a
cordon sanitaire, insulating a bordering state, for example, from the
effects of the neighboring conflict. It can also provide an offensive
instrument to stage cross-border operations. However, the legal
imprecision of a buffer zone means that it offers strategic flexibility for the
side establishing it. A buffer zone’s dual offence-defense characteristic may
be attractive to decision-makers wishing to keep options open.
A no-fly zone is implemented either to protect civilians from aerial attack
or to ensure that allied rebel groups remain viable against an adversary
government.10 No-fly zones are standalone military tools (such as the nofly zone over Libya in 2011) or used in tandem with safe havens and buffer
zones (Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991 is an example
of all three happening at once). Additionally, no-fly zones can be thought
of more as a means of implementing a buffer zone or safe zone alongside
ground and naval forces.
Given the distinction between each of these concepts–distinctions largely
shared by the Turkish government– explaining what best accounts for
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Ankara’s changeable policy towards each option is the goal of this
research. Over the course of 2012-2016, Turkey has mercurially swung
back and forth between each of the demilitarizing options listed above.
Careful qualitative analysis of the period 2012-2016, supported by text
mining of Turkish state-owned press (articles from the Anadolu Agency
(AA) newspapers), reveals that seemingly inexplicable policy shifts are a
reflection of what policy steps had become politically feasible in Turkey
vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. However, before moving onto the analysis
sections, the article explains the methodology employed.

Methodology
The research employs cosine similarity figures and normalization as a
measure to evaluate the closeness of words. Cosine similarity is relatively
simple and lends itself to an intuitive understanding of an issue or
question. That is, it is defined by the inner product of two vectors divided
by the product of their norms. Thus, cosine similarity represents the angle
of two vectors so that it can become one when those vectors have the same
direction. In the context of text mining, the vector represents each word in
the whole text, namely Corpus; therefore, cosine similarity can be used as
a measure of word similarity. As one recent study explains, “A network
consists of units and relations, or nodes and edges. The units are
references and their relations are similarities. In order to observe the
latent similarity structures in the data, the number of co-occurrences must
be normalized.”11 Ahlgren, Jarneving, and Rousseau (2003) proposed the
cosine as similarity criterion.12 According to Leydesdorff, cosine
normalization is preferable has been the subject of increasing consensus
among scientometricians over the past two decades.13
Applying text mining should be considered as a useful methodology in the
field of policy analysis, especially in the case of rapidly changing
situations. Text mining results should be dealt with carefully even though
they can be enlightening when coupled with a time-series analysis and
given a supporting role. For example, as shown in Table 1, the number of
articles for a particular keyword in a particular year is a tiny fraction of
articles issued in a year. Similarly, the number of particular keywords (e.g.
"Safe Zone") may not be large enough for robust calculation of cosine
similarity. Numerically assessing the “risk” of applying text mining with
the small number of words targeted is impossible because a method for
doing so does not exist. The possibility of such a "risk" factor should be
kept in mind when examining the cosine similarity in Table 2. Small
differences in cosine similarity among keywords may not properly
represent the relationship between keywords, if word count of a particular
keyword is small. In the same context, time-series analysis about a
particular keyword should also be conducted with due attention to its
word count shown in Table 2. Still, when researchers are fully aware of
possible pitfalls in applying text mining which is recognized as a
3
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methodology for analyzing related texts quantitatively, it should be a
powerful tool to show a new dimension of the issues being studies. It
should also be kept in mind, when Table 1 and 2 are examined, that
1.
2.

a particular keyword usually appears only once or twice in an
article, and
it does not appear only in a particular context (e.g. official
policy proclamation).

We adopt Word2vec as an algorithm of vector representation of words.
Briefly speaking, Word2vec can be assumed as the optimization of the
conditional appearance probabilities of neighboring words. As a result,
researchers can acquire a high dimensional vector space that represents
the given corpus, which enables us to calculate the cosine similarity.
Tomas Mikolov and his colleagues developed Word2vec at Google in 2013
and it largely relies on the theory of neural networks.14
Many previous studies have used cosine similarity in text mining analysis.
For example, Al-Anzi and AbuZeina examined text classification of Arabic
literature using cosine similarity.15 As the corpus, they used articles of
Alqabas newspaper in Kuwait. More recently, Kristiansen has analyzed the
latent structures of communication in the field of international relations
(IR).16 By using citation data from more than 20,000 articles published in
59 IR journals and employing cosine similarity and text mining,
Kristensen was able to conclude that IR communication remains centered
around American, general and theoretical IR journals and that to practice
this method of communication forms a critical dimension of being an IR
scholar.
We have attempted to employ cosine similarity in a similar manner to that
of some of the existing literature. In doing so, we are able to show a basic
structure of the international relations between Turkey and Syria through
the quantitative analysis of related texts. For our corpus, we use articles
exclusively from AA’s English language publications. We verified that most
articles published on AA’s English-language website were translated from
the original Turkish independently.17 This key fact had a large impact on
our choice of text mining terms given subtle differences or lack thereof
between Turkish and English terms. For example, how do we know that
the English terms for safe zone, buffer zone, and no-fly zone mean the
same thing in Turkish, and, more to the point are translated consistently?
The Turkish phrase tampon bölge has a clear translation as buffer zone.
No-fly zone is usually translated as either uçuşa izin verilmeyen bölge or
uçuşa yasak bölge. Both share the meaning that flight is prohibited and
would be translated as no-fly zone in the English version of AA. When
referring to safe havens in general, Turkish speakers may use the terms
güvenli liman or sığınacak liman. There is, however, a term for safe haven
that has more specific military connotations güvenli bölge. When referring
4
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to safe zones, the term güvenli bölge is also used. We can assume,
therefore, that in the case of establishing a militarily protected safe zone or
safe haven, güvenli bölge would be used in Turkish. Additionally, the fact
that the term güvenli bölge can refer to either safe haven or safe zone as
well as the overwhelming prevalence of the term in Turkish-language
reporting, regardless of media source, and general confusion over the
differences between terms had direct implications in our calculations of
cosine similarity. That is, while our text mining analysis used the terms
safe zone and safe haven, we combined the two in calculating cosine
similarity. As noted, we did this because AA reports are often based on
press releases by or the statements of Turkish government officials. As
such, AA writers and reporters, writing in Turkish and most often using
the term güvenli bölge, likely translated that term as either safe zone or
safe haven in English-language reporting.
We chose articles from AA for another reason: The media outlet is
operated as an arm of the Turkish state.18 Established in 1920, AA has a
mandate to provide news of Turkey and the Turkish government to the
rest of the world. State-dominated media can provide a useful means
through which to monitor, and perhaps scrutinize, the evolving policy and
actions of a government. Governments that dominate the main media
organs in a country do so to control editorial content. The power of
editorial omission is often used to limit any discussion of alternative
policies. As a corollary, media content in such countries conveys progovernment narratives about unfolding policy decisions. Outside observers
have long paid close attention to the content of foreign state-run media
organs in order to make inferential judgements about what that
government is thinking. The level of confidence observers attach to these
inferences depends on the character of the state media, which varies
considerably from state to state. In tightly controlled state media, often as
much can be deduced from what is not said as from that which is. It comes
as little surprise that during the Cold War, Western watchers of the Soviet
Union assiduously read Pravda, the mouthpiece of Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU).19
When it comes to state control over the media, Turkey is not Soviet Russia.
However, while Turkey has arguably enjoyed a relatively open public space
since the late 1980s, press freedoms have been curtailed in recent years.20
The result has become a quasi-commercial media environment in Turkey
in which the ruling AK Party has an increasingly influential editorial hand,
especially over the two state-owned media outlets: The Radio-TV giant
TRT and the AA news agency. Especially through the appointment of new
board members, AA in now more closely connected to the AK Party.21
Because of its increasing politicization and its focus on growing its
international audience akin to China’s CCTV and Russia’s RT, we assess
AA is a sound repository for mapping and gauging the evolution of Turkish
government foreign policy preferences and actions. By utilizing the
5
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methodology detailed above, the remaining sections analyze Turkish
policy towards the Syrian civil war.

2011-2012: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Syria Crisis
After Turkey severed relations with Assad and committed itself to regime
change, it strengthened ties with select opposition groups in Syria in
concert with a range of regional and international actors.22 These included
the US, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which backed various,
often-competing non-state armed actors.23 With little common ground
between groups and their outside supporters besides opposition to Assad,
Syria became a stage set for the enactment of a number of small civil wars
pitting groups against each other with clashing policy agendas set
variously in Ankara, Riyadh, and Washington.24 While the rhetoric
emanating from these capitals and opposition summits was unequivocal
regarding Assad’s departure, there were no correspondingly cooperative
efforts on the ground.
Iran became an increasingly important player, and Iranian soldiers and
Shi’a militias deployed from Iraq supplied critical manpower in support of
Assad. Iran also helped ensure the Assad regime’s survival by mobilizing
its ally Hezbollah and supplying critical weapons and services.25 Russia
was also keen to see the Assad remain to keep its base at Tartus, the only
Russian presence in the Mediterranean. However, Moscow largely played
a waiting game throughout 2012. Yet the unwavering vocal support of
Russia and material support of Iran for Assad would prove critical to the
regime’s survival and was the polar opposite of disjointed efforts, often at
cross-purposes, of the umbrella of opposition.26
As Turkey tried to develop coherent and proactive, rather than reactive
foreign policies, it began to feel the effects of fighting across its 822km
border in two distinct ways. First, it became a direct target of Assad regime
attacks.27 Second, refugees began to flee to Turkey as the humanitarian
disaster unfolded in Syria. However, it attempted to provide succor by
combining the resources of the Turkish Red Crescent with those of Turkish
and foreign NGOs, Turkey possessed neither the money nor the scale of
services necessary to host what was still a trickle of refugees.28
During the course of 2011-2012, most of Syria’s territory contiguous to the
Turkish border remained under regime control. This partially impeded the
movement of refugees into Turkey, but it also meant that forces loyal to
Assad were able to act with a large degree of impunity on both sides of the
border. Ankara viewed the establishment of a buffer zone positively as a
method to help contain the refugee influx without drawing in other
states.29 Ankara proposed the creation of a buffer zone in September 2011
intending to create a safe haven for both rebel forces fighting against the
Syrian government and refugees fleeing the fighting.30 It did so to also
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ensure Syria’s territorial integrity. Ankara repeated calls for international
humanitarian support. “We expect the UN to step in,” said then foreign
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. “When refugee numbers reach thousands, this
problem goes beyond being an internal issue and becomes an international
one. No one has the right to expect Turkey to take on this international
responsibility on its own.”31
Ankara assessed Assad would fall within six months to a year and
therefore stopped short of calling for the creation of a no-fly zone such as
that seen earlier in Libya. Instead, Turkey publicly opposed external
intervention and signaled it would act unilaterally in the creation of a
buffer zone or safe zone. However, Ankara never adequately defined the
concept of a “buffer zone,” instead referring to it as both a safe zone and a
buffer zone with the aim of ensuring Syria’s territorial integrity.32
By 2012, text mining figures compiled from AA demonstrate that semantic
confusion had become even more pronounced, and the policy confusion
that resulted therefrom led Ankara to push for the establishment of buffer
zones that also would have included elements of a safe zone policed by a
no-fly zone (Table 1). In effect, Ankara was pushing for a larger, but
limited intervention in Syria aimed at protecting its borders, shoring up
internal opposition to the Assad regime, and stemming the flow of
refugees.33 This is further demonstrated by and consistent with our cosine
similarity calculations in 2012, where AA articles on buffer zones and nofly zones demonstrated the greatest degree of cosine similarity [0.73]
followed by buffer zone and safe zone [0.67] and no-fly zone and safe zone
[0.59] (Table 2). This indicates not only possible confusion over which
direction to take, but also over differences in terminology that a layman or
even government official would not notice but military personnel would.
This also demonstrates a basic convergence of interest in establishing
buffer zones coupled with calls for a no-fly zone to be policed by Turkey in
concert with other international actors, namely the US.34
At this point in time, there were indications that at least some Turkish
officials assessed the US, perhaps in concert with other NATO allies, would
intervene militarily in Syria after the November 2012 US presidential
elections.35 Turkey also continued to play a visible if less-than-robust role
in multi-party international negotiations.36 Additionally, Turkey began to
respond more forcefully to the Syrian army’s border incursions and
shelling.37 Yet as 2012 ended with shells continuing to fall on Turkish cities
and Assad’s army continuing to strafe and bomb civilians, ever more
domestic pressure began to pile on Ankara to act unilaterally.
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Table 1: Number of Anadolu Agency (AA) articles issued in 2012
to 2016 and number of words appeared.
Year

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Number of Articles

4121

6474

9269

10988

12723

Number of Articles
with "Syria"

1002

1386

1323

1790

2708

Number of Articles
with "Safe Zone"

8

1

25

40

49

Number of Articles
with "Buffer Zone"

16

13

38

30

17

Number of Articles
with "No-fly Zone"

13

10

44

26

32

Number of Articles
with "Safe Haven"

4

5

55

25

29

Word count of
"Syria"

1496

2020

6225

7978

12987

Word count of "Safe
Zone" & "Syria"

16

0

49

83

124

Word count of
"Buffer Zone" &
"Syria"

33

10

64

15

10

Word count of "Nofly Zone" & "Syria"

15

24

72

40

46

Word count of "Safe
Haven" & "Syria"

5

3

71

8

20

2013-2014: Internationalism, refugees and the Kurdish
question
Refugees swamped Turkey in early 2013. They not only affected
southeastern Turkey and the region contiguous to Syria’s borders but also
tipped the demographic balance in Turkey’s cities.38 There were additional
refugees’ camps on the Syrian side of Turkey’s border because Turkey felt
8
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it could no longer absorb refugees and efforts were made to keep at least
some in Syria. The Turkish Red Crescent and other NGOs attempted to
offer these refugees–housed in over 70 makeshift camps strung along the
border–some succor, but access to the camps was dependent on the
shifting positions and fortunes of rebel groups and Syrian government
forces.39 Substantive assistance from governments or the UN was in short
supply–largely on account of the collective action crisis mentioned above.
There was little way for Turkey, as a sovereign state, to ensure even a
modicum of access to humanitarian relief and shelter in Turkey let alone
safety, for the refugees in Syria. After all, Syria remained a sovereign state
with all the rights and obligations inherent to such states under
international law.
Table 2: Cosine similarity and normalization figures from 2012
to 2016
Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2012

Syria

Safe zone

Buffer zone

No-fly zone

0.16

0.27

0.18

0.67

0.59

Safe zone
Buffer zone

0.73

Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2013

Syria

Safe zone

Buffer zone

No-fly zone

none

0.14

0.06

none

none

Safe zone
Buffer zone

0.02

Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2014

Syria

Safe zone

Buffer zone

No-fly zone

0.48

0.20

0.43

0.73

0.95

Safe zone
Buffer zone

0.75

Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2015

Safe zone

Buffer zone

No-fly zone
9
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Syria

0.35

Safe zone

0.20

0.31

0.70

0.76

Buffer zone

0.56

Cosine Similarity of AA articles with "Syria" in 2016

Syria
Safe zone
Buffer zone

Safe zone

Buffer zone

No-fly zone

0.14

0.07

0.25

0.33

0.64
0.28

Throughout 2013 and into 2014, Turkey continued to request UN support
and/or US or NATO support to establish safe zones.40 Ankara felt it
required international legitimacy and consensus in order to cross the
Syrian border and establish such a zone. However, US officials fended off
Turkish requests because they would entail no-fly zones and a wider
American military commitment.41 This appeared to change when chemical
weapons were used in attacks in August 2013 and the US appeared to
reassess its largely non-interventionist stance in Syria. Deft diplomacy by
Moscow in the form of agreeing to monitor the destruction of Assad’s
chemical weapons cache, however, quickly defused the crisis and allowed
the US to avoid any military action in Syria.42 It also demonstrated to the
Russians and others just how deeply reticent the US was to get involved in
Syria.43
In October 2014, as Turkey attempted to address the volatile situation AA
published a map showing Ankara’s proposed safe zones.44 The zone would
stretch from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Akçakale border
crossing, encompassing land on both sides of the Euphrates.45 Turkey then
publicized its willingness to send ground troops into Syria to establish the
safe zone, potentially with US air support.46 However, the zone’s
establishment became more complicated when the Obama administration
decided to support Kurdish fighters of the People’s Protection Units
(YPG), the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the
Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Branded as a
terrorist group by Turkey, the US, the EU, and other states, Turkey has
considered the PKK an existential threat and has combatted a PKK-led
insurgency since 1984.
Turkey confronted US support for the YPG with disbelief and outright
anger. Turkey had attempted to gain US support for various interventions
in Syria since 2012 to no avail. When the US did decide to intervene, it did
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so by using the one group fighting in Syria that Ankara viewed as
potentially the most dangerous to Turkey. Turkey felt betrayed by its ally.

Cosine similarity and normalization figures and analysis
Cosine similarity results based on figures from AA’s 2013 Englishlanguage articles mentioning the various terminologies were inconclusive.
That is, cosine similarity was either extremely low as in the case of Syria
and buffer zones [0.14] or non-existent. This changed in 2014 when AA
articles on safe zones and no-fly zones demonstrated a much greater
degree of cosine similarity [0.95], followed by buffer zones and no-fly
zones [0.75], which were followed by buffer zones and safe zones [0.73].
With the benefit of hindsight as well as the cosine figures, we therefore
posit that Turkish policy makers showed equal interest in no-fly zone/safe
zones, as well as the possible establishment of a combination of
safe/buffer/no-fly zones because this was what was politically feasible in
Turkey at the time.
Related cosine similarity findings reflected Turkey’s contradictory policy
signals vis-à-vis Syria in 2014. These demonstrated a shift in trajectory
from a foreign policy that was largely unilateral in 2012 and therefore
focused on the establishment of buffer zones to secure the border, stem
refugee flows and guarantee Syria’s territorial integrity. Yet by 2014,
Ankara was clearly emphasizing multilateral partner solutions and safe
zones. Turkey did this in order to convince international partners to
participate in efforts to assist refugees and rebel forces, downgrade the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and remove Assad.
Additionally, it did so in order to de-emphasize any perceived unilateral
aims of Turkey.47 To put it colloquially, Ankara and therefore the AA
articles that provided explanations and announcements of government
policy, were throwing terms at the proverbial wall in an effort to see what
would stick. For example, then-prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu insisted,
“We have never used the term buffer zone. We have used the term safe
haven.”48 However, Numan Kurtulmus, the Deputy Prime Minister
contradicted Davutoğlu, noting, “We [Turkey] want a no-fly zone and a
buffer zone [in Syria].”49 This semantic confusion, by no means confined
to Turkey alone,50 is further reflected in cosine similarity results for 2014
where the cosine similarity for all terms is consistently high–an indication
that Turkey’s leaders were themselves confused by the terms and unsure
as to which policies to pursue given the uncertainty of action by the US,
the UN and others.
In hindsight, Turkey’s rhetorical change mattered little. Turkey’s calls for
safe zones or safe havens were met with grudging support or downright
rejection. The US still considered Syria a low priority while Iran and the
Syrian regime warned against the move. Russia also signaled its
opposition to the plan, particularly as it filled the power vacuum left by the
11
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absence US forces in the region.51 Moscow and Damascus realized they
had much-increased military and political opportunity spaces in which to
operate, though Russia remained a largely invisible actor throughout 2014.
However, Assad and his main ally, Iran, attempted to turn the tide against
various rebel forces. This resulted in some hard-won gains that by the
close of 2014 resulted in a fluid stalemate characterized by fluctuating
battle lines but no clear momentum. This changed rapidly in 2015 Syrian
government forces suffered a series of military setbacks.

2015-2016: Russia’s Entry into Syria and Turkey’s Calculations
In July 2015, Assad made a formal request to Russia for military
assistance, to include air strikes. Russia duly complied sending warplanes,
tanks, and combat troops. Ships of the Black Sea Fleet were there by
September.52
As Ankara touted the establishment of safe zones in concert with some
type of no-fly zone in public, in private it again mulled the establishment
of buffer zones through unilateral military incursions.53 Erdoğan favored
this strategy given recent advances by YPG fighters, but Turkey’s military
was less sanguine.54 Turkey now counted both Iran and Russia as its
southern neighbors in Syria, further complicating an already difficult
position. Suspicious of Russia’s motives, Turkey took a strongly defensive
position against Russian actions in Syria. Things came to a head in
November 2015 when Turkey downed a Russian aircraft. Russian anger
over the downing of its jet and the subsequent murder of its pilot boiled
over as protesters burned Turkish flags and broke windows at the Turkish
Embassy in Moscow. President Vladimir Putin immediately issued a
restrictive visa regime and a blanket travel ban on Turkey and a battery of
economic sanctions.
Turkey’s economy, already pummeled by a strong dollar, loss of significant
trade with Syria and hosting millions of Syrian refugees sustained a
further blow when Russian tourists and businesspeople vanished.
Additionally, Turkey had become the target of deadly terrorist attacks by
ISIL beginning in mid-2015. Not only had the Russians departed, but
other visitors also avoided Turkey. When an attempted coup d’état sought
to remove Erdoğan from power in July 2016, it shook the Turkish Republic
to its foundations. Turks were not only shocked by the coup attempt, with
many believing that coups d’état were longer possible in Turkey,55 but fed
up with Ankara’s inability to stem the flow of refugees and limit the
violence in Syria.56 As Ankara attempted to recover and formulate a
response, international reactions to the attempted coup largely informed
Turkey’s new stance vis-à-vis Syria. Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım
officially announced Ankara’s new Syria policy in late August 2016.
Importantly, it included working with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United
States, and Russia as well as Syria’s Assad for a settlement to the crisis.57
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In the charged post-coup atmosphere, Ankara realized its Syria policy of
supporting opposition militias against Assad underestimated his staying
power and had “…overlooked the fact that [Assad] had over the years
gained a status over and above ethnic and sectarian divisions.”58 Ankara’s
newfound willingness to work with Russia was also driven by pragmatism
and Moscow’s condemnation of the attempted coup.59 Turkey also realized
Iran, which had also condemned the coup, was a difficult partner, but one
that shared Turkey’s interest in stopping the establishment of a Kurdish
state.60 In contrast, NATO allies were slow to condemn the coup and sent
mixed signals to Ankara.61
As relations with Russia improved, Turkey quickly sought Russian support
for a safe zone stretching approximately 40 km into Syria that would act as
a buffer between two Kurdish-held areas to the east and west and against
ISIL to the south. Though relations between Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran
had improved, Ankara remained formally opposed to President Bashar alAssad staying in power and was unhappy about Russian operations against
anti-Assad fighters as well as Iran’s efforts to bolster the regime.

Cosine similarity and normalization figures and analysis
Regardless of the political and strategic differences on the ground, Turkey
and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran appeared to work quickly in the
latter half of 2016 to institute safe zones policed by no-fly zones. Our
cosine similarity calculations from 2015 support this as a consensus
formed in Ankara that safe zones bolstered by no-fly zones should form
one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s Syria policy. Cosine similarity results
from 2015 (Table 2) appear to demonstrate almost equal support in
Ankara for a combination of safe zones and no-fly zones [0.76]. A
combination of safe zones and buffer zones [0.70] closely followed. A
combination of buffer zones and no-fly zones [0.56] came last. In essence,
cosine similarity results in 2015 arguably point to a “gelling” of views in
Ankara that distances 2015 from the confusion of the previous three years
and marks a turning point in Turkey’s Syria policy options and strategic
choices.
By 2016, cosine similarity was again highest in relation to safe zones
policed by a no-fly zone [0.64], but that number dropped from a high in
2014 of [0.95]. Similarly, in 2016, cosine similarity figures indicate a
further hardening of Ankara’s stance vis-à-vis pushing for a combination
of safe zones [0.33] and no-fly zones [0.28]. The cosine similarity
calculations also adequately reflected Ankara’s acceptance of realities on
the ground and its rapprochement with Russia that continued into 2017.
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Conclusion
Syria’s ongoing civil war has been a source acute instability in Turkey.
Turkish foreign policy in relation to the crisis has appeared to be largely
reactive in nature, as Ankara has shifted policy and state action to address
the changing situation on the ground and as the number of foreign states
acting in Syria steadily increased in the years 2011-2016. This research is
an attempt to shed light on what best accounts for Ankara’s changeable
policy towards various foreign policy options such as buffer zones and nofly zones by utilizing methodologies such as text mining and related cosine
similarity measures of reporting by the Anadolu Agency (AA), a Turkish
state-owned press. Applying these methodologies in concert with content
analysis and qualitative analysis, we have demonstrated that Turkey’s
seemingly inexplicable policy shifts at times adhered to a logic and, in
some cases, could have been anticipated. Utilizing such methodologies
therefore offers a potentially significant contribution to the literature by
defining politically feasible outcomes related to foreign or domestic
policies. The accompanying time-series analysis conducted has shown
numerically and vividly how the use of keywords by the Government of
Turkey has changed over time. While these findings are valid, reliable, and
generalizable, a note of caution is required. The number of articles for a
particular keyword can represent on a fraction of articles issued in a year.
Similarly, the number of particular keywords (for example, Buffer Zone)
may not be large enough for robust calculation of cosine similarity.
Numerically assessing the “risk” of applying text mining with the small
number of words targeted is impossible because a method for doing so
does not exist. In short, further testing should be performed using these
same methodologies and these should never stand on alone but rather
support time-series analyses as well as primary and secondary sources. In
the case of this article, our attempt has further demonstrated that the use
of text mining in a supporting role with robust qualitative analysis of staterun media sources can yield valuable results and insights in the field of
foreign policy analysis and security studies.
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